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THE ANDEAN INVESTMENT CODE
Stanley R. Lisocki*
I. Introduction
The Latin American countries urgently need to improve their deteriorating
external trade in the world market. This decline becomes evident with the
juxtaposition of the population and trade statistics of Latin America. From
1950 to 1970 the population of Latin America increased from six to approxi-
mately ten per cent of the world population, yet during that same period Latin
America's participation in world trade dropped from about eight to four and
one-half per cent.' Efforts to turn about this extremely unfavorable trend have
been forthcoming since World War II. One remedy, initiated around 1960, is a
dedication to regional integration.
The concept of regional integration displaced the prevailing doctrine of
substitution of imports--a national policy which had predominated in Latin
American countries since the end of World War I.2 Substitution of imports is
a policy designed to create jobs in industry and to save foreign exchange through
the development of small and medium size national industries protected by a
wall of high tariffs, import quotas, and prohibitions. However, a decade of
experience had demonstrated that such restrictive trade policies resulted in
inefficiently produced goods with a consequent rise in costs. Savings in foreign
exchange proved all but illusory because it was necessary to import high-cost
machinery and spare parts. This problem was further aggravated by a tendency
to overexpand. Moreover, where raw materials were not available locally and
had to be imported at a cost disproportionately large compared to the value
added in local manufacturing processes, the net effect of this policy would some-
times be to increase rather than reduce foreign exchange expenses.
Regional integration focuses on counteracting the adverse effects of the
import substitution trade policy by increasing the size of available markets and
facilitating the division and specialization of labor. Thus more efficient produc-
tion and accelerated economic development will be possible.' A further objec-
tive of the regional trade agreements is to gain greater bargaining power in
world trade negotiations.
The idea of Latin American integration was first realized when eleven
Western Hemisphere countries organized the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA) in February 1960 by the Montevideo Treaty. Notwith-
standing the very satisfactory growth of trade within LAFTA during the first
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years of its existence, the progress of economic integration has been slow and
difficult.
There are many reasons why progress has stalled. LAFTA did not adopt
the European Common Market system of progressive and automatic tariff reduc-
tion, but instead employed a system of product-by-product negotiations. This
system worked well initially when discussion centered on products in which only
one or two countries had an interest. As an example, Argentina, Brazil, and
Colombia found it relatively easy to negotiate reciprocal concessions involving
coffee and fine raw wool. Among these three parties, coffee is produced only in
Brazil and Colombia, whereas Argentina is the only producer of high-quality
wool. Positions soon harden, however, when negotiations turn to a product like
woolen piece goods which are manufactured in all three countries. The force
of vested interests, unwilling to face new competition, is evidenced at the negoti-
ating table.
Other difficulties encountered include: first, the unstable currency and
balance of payments problems, suffered by almost all of the member nations,
which did not permit the adoption of free foreign exchange transfers, and,
second, the great distances which separated the participating countries coupled
with the absence of suitable transportation facilities. Finally, the lack of progress
toward integration may be attributed in part to the great disparity in the levels
of economic and industrial development attained by the LAFTA countries
which, in this regard, divide into three distinct groups: (1) the so-called "big
three"--Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, (2) the intermediate groups, charac-
terized by insufficient markets-Chile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and Uruguay,
and (3) the least developed countries-Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay.4 This
last problem is reflected in the fact that during the first years of LAFTA's exis-
tence Argentina and Mexico substantially increased their exports to LAFTA
countries while Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, all future members of the
Andean Common Market, found that their intrazone trade deficit tripled in
favor of other LAFTA countries.5
These developments coupled with the generally slow progress of LAFTA
led the five neighboring Andean countries, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
and Peru, to create the subregional Andean Common Market (ANCOM).
Established by the Cartagena Agreement on May 26, 1969, ANCOM was
created with the approval of LAFTA to function as an entity within the free
trade area. Later, in February 1973, Venezuela joined the Andean group
although reserving the right to remain exempt from tariff reductions on maxi-
mum 250 items until 1979.6 Although the thrust of ANCOM is similar to
LAFTA there are basic differences. Primarily, LAFTA is a scheme for trade
agreements in which participating countries will exchange tariff concessions
among themselves. The LAFTA agreement establishes no goal of reaching a
uniform tariff vis-a-vis outside countries and no fixed obligation to suppress all
4 See Wionczek, The Rise and the Decline of Latin American Economic Integration. 9 J.
OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES (1970).
5 See THE ANDEAN COMMON MARKET, BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL (1970). Research
report published by the Business International Corporation of New York City.
6 Acta final de negociaciones entre la "Comision' y el Gobierno de Venezuela, El
Universal (Caracas), February 15, 1971.
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the trade barriers presently separating the national markets of the member
countries. On the other hand, ANCOM countries adopted a common market
structure thereby acquiring an obligation-although certain items were pro-
visionally excepted-to eliminate progressively and automatically the barriers
among themselves by December 1980 and to create a common external tariff
by December 1985. The purpose of the Andean Common Market is to promote
industrial growth within the ANCOM area and to create within LAFTA a
bloc which in the future will be able to deal with the "big. three" on equal
terms.
An appreciation of the economic significance of ANCOM may be gleaned
from the following statistics. Comparing gross national products, the G.N.P.
of the Andean group including Venezuela during the years 1969-1970 was $31.2
billion as against $21.0 billion for Argentina, $33.7 billion for Brazil, and $31.6
billion for Mexico." In 1970 the population of the six countries totaled around
65 million. A publication of the Pan American Union in Washington projects
that by 1985 the population of the Andean countries will reach 100 million
people, 70 per cent of whom will live in the cities and 32 per cent of whom
will be economically active. The G.N.P., according to the same study, should
by 1985 increase to about $60 billion (real dollar growth)-roughly double
their combined G.N.P. of 1969.
In December 1969 the foreign investments of the United States totaled
$70.76 billion of which $20.00 billion was invested in less developed countries.
The book value of United States direct investments in the five founding AN-
COM countries exceeded $2.4 billion on December 31, 1969. In this regard,
Venezuela occupies a special position because of the extensive U.S. investments
in oil extraction. With U.S. investments amounting to $2.67 billion on that
same date, Venezuela leads Latin America in attracting U.S. capital-trailed by
Brazil and Mexico, each with about $1.63 billion." Thus, the more than $5.0
billion invested in ANCOM countries represented 25 per cent of all U.S. invest-
ments in the Third World-a very important position which unfortunately since
then has been constantly diminishing because of expropriations in Chile and
Peru and a general shift in interest from Latin America to Asia and Africa on
the part of U.S. investors.
A view supported by some national and foreign advisors'0 is that a pre-
requisite of a successful regional integration is the establishment of a common
policy toward foreign private investments. Pursuant to this view and after
extensive study and long discussion, a foreign investment code was approved on
December 31, 1970. Officially, it is Decision 24 of the Commission, ANCOM's
governing body, and is titled "Common Rules Governing the Treatment of
Foreign Capital, Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties." (Hereafter
referred to as the Investment Code.)
7 ANNUAL REPORT, Inter-American Development Bank (1971).
8 GRUPo ANDINO, SEPARATO No. 11 (1972).
9 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION, SURVEY
oF CURRENT BUSINESS (1970).
10 See M. WIONcZEK, LATIN AMERICAN EcoNoMIc INTEGRATION (1966).
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II. The Investment Code:" Objectives, Rules, and Definitions
The main objectives of the Investment Code are:
1) To allow the private foreign investor to participate only in those sectors
of the economy which cannot yet be served by nationals and which at the same
time are considered significant to the economic growth of the host country. In
certain key areas new foreign investments will be completely proscribed; also,
existing foreign investors will be obliged to gradually reduce their combined
equity position in any enterprise to a maximum 20 per cent interest within a
specified period of time.
2) To assure that in the future the privilege associated with operating in
ANCOM is available only to national or mixed enterprises. 2 This privilege
entitles the enterprise to sell goods within the six-country area under conditions
of reduced or eliminated tariff barriers. To reach this objective the Investment
Code adopts the fade-out principle. Under this scheme the foreign investor who
seeks the ANCOM privilege for his enterprise must agree with the appropriate
authority that during a specified period of time he will gradually sell off a part
of his equity so that his participation is reduced to a minority position at the
deadline. The privileged access to the ANCOM market will be accorded to a
foreign enterprise in the process of being transformed into a national or mixed
one.
3) To regulate and control patents, royalties, and technology transfers.
Restrictions on payments for these rights are imposed.
4) To assure that under no circumstances will the foreign investor receive
better treatment than that afforded nationals and that no member of ANCOM
will give to any foreign investor more favorable treatment than is allowed under
the rules established by the Investment Code.
5) To restrict the use of local credit by foreign companies, to limit the use
of foreign loans and the rate of interest paid for these loans, and to limit to
five per cent the amount of reinvestment allowed to a foreign enterprise.
6) To enforce a principle that any conflict with a foreign investor must
be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the host country.
7) To forbid any acquisition or takeover by a foreign investor of any
existing enterprise in the Andean area and to support the creation of intra-
regional, national enterprises.
On the other hand, each participating country guarantees to the foreign
investor the right to repatriate dividends up to a maximum 14 per cent of
investment, and the right to withdraw the capital and capital gain. Although
the Investment Code provides no formal guarantee, the process of agreeing in
advance to fade out gives to the foreign investor a certain de facto assurance
against the risk of future confiscation.
Any new foreign investment in the ANCOM area must be authorized by
the appropriate national control office-according to Article Two of the Code,
11 See 1972 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 126.
12 Andean Investment Code art. 1.
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each country will establish its own."3 Registration of all existing investments and
authorizations for all agreements required by the Code will be handled by these
same offices, each of which must in turn coordinate with the Board of ANCOM
which is charged with ensuring the uniform enforcement of the Investment
Code. In addition, the Board will gather and analyze information concerning
foreign investments, technology arrangements, patents, etc., drawn from the
entire Andean area.
It is important to note that the common rules established in the Investment
Code provide the minimum restrictions14 to be applied to foreign investments,
while permitting the imposition of further restraints by member countries. Because
the Investment Code is not a precise and thoroughly binding codification of
principle, but only an agreement on minimum standards, it gives no assurance
of future stability. The rules of the game may still change although only in
one direction-less favorable to the foreign investor. It would seem that had the
participating countries clearly delimited the scope of foreign investment endorsed
by the authority of an international treaty instead of the agreement on minimum
rules, they would have given the foreign investor, as compensation for the restric-
tions imposed, an assurance of the stability of the newly adopted rules.
Much of the substance of the rules and objectives of the Investment Code
is contained within its definitions. Perhaps most important are the concepts of
"mixed company" and "national company." A national company is an enter-
prise in which at least 80 per cent of the equity is controlled by national investors.
A mixed company is an enterprise in which at least 51 per cent of the equity
belongs to national investors. In both types, management control must actually
reflect the proportion of equity ownership. Even though the national equity in
an enterprise is 51 or 80 per cent, if this proportion is not reflected in technical,
financial and administrative management, the company will be considered for-
eign. Also, the Investment Code distinguishes between existing foreign enter-
prises, those established prior to June 30, 1971, and new ones established there-
after. The term "national investor" includes member states, as well as national
individuals and enterprises of any ANCOM member. A foreign citizen, with
a minimum consecutive residence of one year in the host country, who renounces
the right to transfer profits abroad or to re-export his invested capital is also a
national investor.
The following are subject to agreement between the foreign enterprise and
the control office of any member country within whose territory the existing or
new industry is established: the method of determining the value of the
shares at the time of required sale; the process of ensuring the progressive partic-
ipation of national investors in the management of the company; and the period
of time in which foreign investors must partially divest ownership. Although the
maximum time period for fully effecting the transformation will also be estab-
lished in the agreement, the process must be completed within 15 years in Colom-
bia, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela and within 20 years in Ecuador and Bolivia,
who because of their lesser stage of development are allowed to apply this
13 Id. art. 2.
14 Oliver, The Andean Investment Code, 66 Am. J. OF INT'L L. 763 (1972).
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extended period. Agreements to gradually transform into a mixed enterprise
concluded within the more developed countries must stipulate that the equity
participation of national investors will be not less than 15 per cent at the time
production begins, not less than 30 per cent at the end of the first third of the
agreed transformation period, and not less than 45 per cent upon the expiration
of two thirds of that period. In the case of the less developed countries, Bolivia
and Ecuador, these percentages are reduced.
The existing foreign company, not agreeing to the fade-out of foreign
control, but which is not operating in an economic sector reserved exclusively to
nationals may continue to operate provided at least 15 per cent of its shares
are held by national investors. In this case, as indicated earlier, the company
will not be accorded the privilege of the common market. As previously observed,
since the Investment Code sets down only minimum restrictions, there is no
guarantee that the fade-out principle will not, on a country-by-country basis, be
later extended to the old industries.
Moreover, the existing foreign enterprise has three years from the effective
date of the Investment Code to decide whether it wants to be transformed into a
mixed or national enterprise and thereby gain access to the common market.
Whatever the decision, before the three-year period ends the company must
ensure that at least 15 per cent of its equity is owned by national investors.
No establishment of a new foreign enterprise or new direct foreign invest-
ment will be permitted in the public-service sector, i.e., water, electric power,
telecommunication, etc. New foreign investment will also be refused in com-
mercial banks or other financial institutions, domestic transportation, news-
papers, television, and in the sectors of insurance, advertising and domestic
marketing. As originally formulated, existing foreign banks were required to
cease receiving local deposits of any type within three years from the date on
which the Investment Code was promulgated if during that period they failed
to attain national company status, i.e., 80 per cent of equity held by national
investors. This provision came under heavy attack in Colombia and finally was
modified allowing each country to apply differing regulations adapted to its
own circumstances." A foreign enterprise which presently operates in these
restricted sectors must convert into a national enterprise within a period not
exceeding three years. Each member country may also reserve additional sectors
of economic activity for national enterprises, public or private, and, in addition,
determine whether mixed companies shall be admitted to these added sectors.
In summary, the basic restrictions fall on old and new enterprises with
much the same effect. The concessions granted to existing enterprises are: 1)
in the key areas, where entry of new investment is prohibited, the existing
investor may retain 20 per cent ownership and may, in certain cases, obtain
local permission to retain 49 per cent; 2) in other areas the old company may
remain "foreign" conserving 85 per cent of the equity in the hands of foreign
investors, provided it relinquishes the privilege of the common market.
Supplementing the rules set forth in this section are certain exceptions con-
15 The corresponding Article 42 of the Code was modified in this sense by a decision of
the Commission of Cartagena Agreement in 1972, after it was modified by the Colombian
Congress before the ratification of the Cartagena Agreement.
[December 1973]
THE ANDEAN INVESTMENT CODE
cerning enterprises dedicated to basic products and mixed companies having
the state as a partner. Discussion of these exceptions has been postponed to the
following section. Only cursory mention has been made of the very strict con-
trols applied to industrial property, trademarks, patents, and licenses as these
are not investments of capital, and thus, lie outside the scope of this article.
These aspects are defined by articles 18 to 26 of the Investment Code.
III. Origin and Background
It seems that the Board of the Andean Common Market which proposed
the Investment Code went further in restricting foreign capital than was the
intention of the creators of the Andean pact itself. It had been agreed in Car-
tagena that a uniform treatment of foreign capital must be established. How-
ever, Dr. Vallejo, Colombian Minister of Economy who represented Colombia
at the initial negotiations of ANCOM and was one of the main promoters of
the Cartagena Agreement, declared that the main reason for this restrictiveness
was the fear of a war of incentives among Andean countries to attract foreign
capital. 6 According to Minister Vallejo, the idea was to attract foreign capital
to each country under the same conditions, to establish the maximum incentives,
and to regulate only the functions of the foreign capital, licenses, and patents.
The Board, with its advisors, proposed investment regulations which
substantially distorted the original intent of the Cartagena Agreement, at least
on the Colombian side. It seems to have been influenced by legislation existing
in Mexico called "Mexicanization" which provides that foreign capital may
operate only on a joint-venture basis in which the foreign investor is limited to
a maximum 49 per cent of equity." Other obvious influences were the new
"Industrial Law" of Peru with its harsh provisions for the foreign "fade-out"'"
and the antiforeign attitude prevailing in Chile and Peru which, to a lesser extent,
had already begun to influence Colombian thinking. Board members and
advisors also shared the conviction that multinational companies had received
excessive advantages from the LAFTA tariff reductions and were determined
to prevent ANCOM from becoming a playground for the giant multinational
corporations even at the cost of slower economic growth. 9
They responded to the general fear of superior North American technology
and efficiency-a fear deeply shared by certain sectors of business community
which feel unable to compete with the American technology and research
16 M. Rizo, Colombia and the Andean group in the process of Latin American Integra-
tion (1972) '(unpublished thesis in Memorial Library, University of Notre Dame).
17 Mexicanization is a set of different governmental rules restricting direct foreign in-
vestments operating since 1966. The rules and their interpretation are becoming harsher.
These rules are based theoretically on a law existing since 1944 which previously was not
applied. The Industry is divided into 6 sectors with different principles for foreign investments
being applicable to each sector. Generally speaking, a new investment with more than 49%
of foreign equity is prohibited. Also local credit for foreign-owned firms has been restricted
since 1967. As the Andean Code is based on certain Mexican principles, so, on the other hand,
Mexico adopted in 1971 a new law regulating foreign patents, trademarks and royalties based
on the Andean Investment Code. See generally Mwxco. OPERATING FOR PROFIT IN A CHANG-
INo MARxET, published by Business International Corp., New York (1971).
18 The so-called "general law for the industries" proclaimed by the Peruvian Military
Junta in 1972.
19 THE ANDEAN COMMON MARET, BuSINESS INTERNATIONAL (1971).
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facilities. Following a nationalistic philosophy, ANCOM has decided to deprive
foreign capital of its power in the name of sovereignty and keep the common
market economy in the full control of its members. Nevertheless, they wanted
to bring in new foreign capital, but with no great cost, for limited periods of
time, under strict governmental control, within beneficial production areas, and
lastly, with total exclusion from the key areas.
Apart from their nationalistic philosophy," many of the new and especially
the younger economists in Latin America adhere to socialistic economic prin-
ciples and wish accordingly to increase state control of the economy. Although
the Investment Code speaks equally of private nationals or companies and the
state, in reality the state is almost always the only available buyer for the shares
of a foreign corporation in the process of fading out. Confirmation that future
state ownership is one of the real objectives of the Investment Code can be found
in Article 36 and Decision 47, which determine that although normally a cor-
poration is considered mixed if the foreign investment does not surpass 49 per
cent of capital, the percentage of foreign equity can be increased to 70 per cent
if the national partner is the state or a state-owned enterprise on the condition
that the state or the entity controlled by the state maintains the "decisive power"
in managing the company. This may be achieved by issuing to the state or
semi-state entities special voting shares or conceding a veto power.
In the basic-products sector, i.e., the exploitation of minerals, hydrocarbons,
pipelines and forests, which until now has been the most important area of
economic relations between the United States and Latin America, the Invest-
ment Code clearly indicates a preference for authorizing foreign exploitation in
association with the recipient state enterprise. In any event, this basic sector
will operate mainly under a concession system under which the concession,
after a maximum period of twenty years, will revert to the state. The exploi-
tation of hydrocarbons by a foreign enterprise shall be authorized preferably in
the form of contracts of association with a state enterprise. But, because this
sector is also the most important to the host countries which lack the capital or
skill to initiate operations themselves, the Investment Code is more liberal in
this area allowing concessions for specified periods without national participation.
Concessions may be granted during the first ten years of the Investment Code's
existence and for a maximum twenty-year period.
Finally, though on the surface the Latin Americans appear only to defend
their economies from so-called "imperialistic exploitation," they are also, con-
sciously or not, defending their own system of values and cultural pattern which
totally differs from North American standards. The foreign enterprise is more
powerful and efficient than its Latin American counterpart. Thus, as the busi-
ness community is presently extending its influence further into the personal
sphere of life, the Latins are afraid that if foreign businesses, especially Ameri-
can, were to dominate their social environment, they would eventually lose
their own traditional personality and culture.
Returning to the nationalistic sentiments which shaped the Investment
20 See H. JOHNSON, ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN OLD AND NEW STATES (1967).
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Code, it is interesting to note the views of Professor Hirschman"' who believes
that there is too much American investment in the relatively small Latin Ameri-
can market. For this reason, he is of the opinion that existing investments should
be reduced in order to promote a general political understanding between the
two Americas. Professor Hirschman's opinion that divesting present U.S. invest-
ments will improve the general political relations between the United States and
Latin America is of great importance. Indeed, in recent years these relations
have not been helped at all by disputes between private American investors
and the Latin American governments.
Professor Hirschman's article was written in 1969 when the dispute with
Peru about the International Petroleum Company began. Some political de-
velopments occurring in Latin America in subsequent years may eventually
prove the validity of his thesis. Focusing on the relation between United States
and Latin America, the American investments amounted in 1967 to 1.255 bil-
lion dollars in Chile, representing 24.3 per cent of its GNP. In Peru, American
investments amounted to 960 million dollars, representing 20.7 per cent of its
GNP, and in Colombia investments of 650 million dollars composed 12.3 per
cent of its GNP. The probability is great that these figures have more than a
casual relation to the expropriations by Chile and Peru of American invest-
ments and the absence of such occurrences by the Colombian Government.
Moreover, the antiforeign feelings are less prevalent in Colombia than in the
other Latin American countries.22 Further, Argentina, where the American
private investments reached 1.244 billion dollars by 1969,"5 has become violently
opposed to foreign, mainly American, investors.
On the other hand, according to Professor Wionczek, a Mexican economist
and advisor to the Cartagena Agreement and to many less developed countries
in Latin America and Africa,2" the nationalizations in the less developed coun-
tries are respondings to the political necessities created by political demagogy,
not by any coherent economical strategy. The economical results of expropria-
tions of copper in Chile and of oil in Bolivia in earlier years and the consequent
declines in production demonstrate the validity of Professor Wionczek's thesis.
Also, according to Professor Wionczek, similar effects caused by nationalization
and excessively nationalistic policies are evident in different African countries.
The developments in Bolivia and Chile may be compared with the ten per cent
to eleven per cent yearly growth rate of Brazil. Although there American invest-
ments reached 1.633 billion dollars in 1969 and a basically nationalistic policy
is followed, no expropriation policy has been sought and enormous economical
success has been achieved. The logical conclusion follows that although a high
percentage of foreign investment in a particular country increases political ten-
sions and opens the road to demagogy, the decision concerning expropriations is
purely political and results in negative effects on the economy of the country.
Professor Hirschman proposed the creation of an "International Divest
21 A. Hirschman, How to Divest in Latin America and Why, Princeton essay, No. 76, 1969.
(Hirschman is a Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University.)
22 M. WIONCzEK, EL GRUPO ANDINO Y LA INVERSION EXTRANJERA PRIVADA (1972).
23 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 9.
24 M. WIONCZEK, supra note 22.
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Corporation" which with the support of the Inter-American Bank or some other
international financial institution would buy from existing investors certain
quantities of American-owned shares and resell them to national investors on
a long-term credit basis. Under his proposal, to improve income distribution,
a preference would be given by first offering these shares to the people who work
for the corresponding companies or, in any event, to as many small investors as
possible. This plan also includes the possibility of arriving at fixed arrangements
for divesting within a specified period of time.25 In his essay Professor Hirsch-
man mentions that his views are shared by Professor Paul Rosenstein of M.I.T.
who one year later became the official advisor to the Board which proposed
the Investment Code. It is interesting to observe that the drafters of the Code
were influenced not only by Latin American nationalism but also by some well-
known American scholars whose opinions were derived from another perspective.
It should be stressed that while Hirschman's proposal was directed at
existing foreign investments, the Investment Code took the further and perhaps
precarious step of applying the divestiture requirement to future investments as
well as subjecting them to other restrictions. The Board was probably of the
view that these steps would not result in a severe loss of new foreign investments
because of the offsetting attraction inherent in the new common market.
In an effort to evaluate the significance of this wider market, it will be
helpful to set forth some statistics bearing on intrazone trade. In 1969 the trade
among the five original ANCOM countries did not reach 3 per cent of their
total external trade. During 1970 it improved significantly. With ANCOM
tariff reductions not yet in effect, intrazone trade reached a total of $120.4-
million, an average annual increase of about 30 per cent during the 1968-70
period, according to the annual report of Inter-American Development Bank.
The data for Venezuelan exports to ANCOM countries was not included in
these ANCOM statistics as Venezuela did not join the Andean Common Market
until February 1973. Whatever the figures, the percentage of Venezuela's export
trade with ANCOM was surely insignificant in light of the fact that about 95
per cent of Venezuelan exports consist of petroleum and iron ore-products
which are not imported by ANCOM countries. To reflect the present state of
trade development within ANCOM, it may be helpful to compare Colombia's
intrazone trade with its trade with the United States. In 1972 Colombia ex-
ported 7 per cent of its total trade to member countries while importing 4.1
per cent from them. On the other hand, Colombia's trade with the United
States amounted to 33 per cent of her exports and 41 per cent of her imports.
Colombian exports to all the Andean countries have been growing during the
last years even before the first tariff reductions were effective; they amounted
to $44 million in 1970, $57 million in 1971 and $82 million in 1972.
Figures on the development of trade resulting from similar trade agree-
ments should indicate ANCOM's potential. For instance, the intraregiona
25 The author has no direct knowledge why Professor Hirschman's proposal was not put
to trial; but comparing the enormous needs of Latin American countries to the relatively
limited resources of international financial institutions, it appears that this project was not
of sufficient priority. Although it has political advantages, it has little economic merit for
development.
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trade within LAFTA countries doubled within the first six years and later in-
creased at a rate of about 10 per cent annually. The Central American Common
Market (CACM) was initially far more successful than LAFTA with intra-
regional trade increasing at an annual rate of about 35 per cent from 1961 to
1968 although political troubles have reversed this trend. Lastly, the Caribbean
Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) has increased intrazonal exports 27 per
cent annually compared with its combined 11.7 per cent growth rate for total
Cxports.
2
IV. Reaction and Consequences
One problem which arises when several countries of different political
orientations attempt to adopt common regulations for foreign investment is that
governments who represent a more radical point of view are more emotionally
involved and seek to impose their perspective upon the moderate-thinking gov-
ernments. Apart from emotion, there is a very practical reason for this pressure."7
It is obvious that if the radicals were determined to impose harsh regulations
on foreign investors, other countries within the common market which main-
tained a middle-of-the-road approach would be the preferred site of multi-
national corporations with their accompanying know-how and technology. Ac-
cording to different private sources, this was determinative in developing the
Investment Code.
The first reaction to the Investment Code rules came from the Colombian
private sector which approved the fade-out and joint-venture concepts in a
limited form only and opposed many of the other provisions of the Investment
Code. The private sector-more realistic in its understanding of the critical
role played by new foreign capital, know-how, progressive management, and
technology in the process of economic development-feared that the provisions
of the Investment Code would cause a substantial decrease in the interest of
foreign investors in the Andean area and especially in Colombia.2 s
The fact is that as a result of a prevailing antagonism toward the foreign
investor in recent years and a general lack of confidence in the stability of gov-
ernmental regulations, the inflow of investment capital into many Latin Ameri-
can countries has been very low. For instance, Colombia which should have
far more ability to attract foreign investment than other member countries of
ANCOM, due to the recent political events in Chile and Peru, has also been
failing to attract foreign investors. Direct foreign investment in the Colombian
manufacturing sector dropped from about $20 million per year in the 1967-69
period to approximately $7.5 million in 1970,' although it seems this situation
has improved in the last two years.
26 Socio-economic progress in Latin America, ANNUAL REPORT, Interamerican Develop-
ment Bank (1971).
27 Hirschman and Behrman, Sharing International Production through the Multinational
Enterprise and Regional Integration, LAw AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (1972).
28 How will multinational firms react to the Andean Pacts Decision 24? INTERAMERICAN
AFFAIRS, Vol. XXV, No. 2, 1971.
29 INFORIE SOBRE LA INVERSION PRIVADA EXTRANJERA EN COLOMBIA, DEPARTMENTO
ADMINISTRATIVA NACIONAL DE PLANEACION (1971).
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Adverse reaction in Colombia culminated in an effort to prevent Invest-
ment Code approval. Opponents questioned whether the discrimination be-
tween foreign and national investors was constitutional and legal within the
norm of international law. The legal argument was lost on the ground that a
sovereign state possesses the inherent right to dictate in advance provisions which
it considers convenient. However, the court did decide that the Investment
Code must be ratified by the Congress which later occurred. A rule which pro-
vides that "[m]ember countries shall not grant to foreign investors any treat-
ment more favorable than that granted to national investors," and in the same
breath dictates severe and discriminatory treatment for foreign investors must
be considered if not illegal, at least unjust. The pragmatic justification for this
type of discrimination is that the disproportion of strength between the local
capital of Andean countries and that of the multinational corporations has
justified lesser developed countries in taking certain measures in self-defense.
During the last national assembly in October 1972, ANDI, the Colombian
Association of Industry, approved an official declaration which provides: (1)
that the role which a multinational corporation plays in the economic develop-
ment, particularly in manfacturing products which can be exported to third
countries, is essential, (2) that the Investment Code in its present form endan-
gers the probability of new foreign investments, and (3) that Colombia should
as a sovereign nation retain the right to determine in specific cases whether the
investment of a multinational corporation on a joint venture basis, but with a
majority of foreign equity, is convenient for the country. In view of the fore-
going, ANDI declared that it will continue to make all possible efforts to change
the Investment Code regulations."0 It is extremely doubtful that ANDI will be
able to win this point since any determined effort by Colombia to alter the
Investment Code may very well risk the destruction of ANCOM unity. The
ANDI declaration, although not explicit, clearly implies that the political reali-
ties are such that the Investment Code decisions have been imposed on Colom-
bia by other ANCOM countries.
There is another negative consequence of the Investment Code policy
which would influence all but the most highly emotional nationalists. The main
weaknesses of less developed countries are a lack of capital for investments and
a scarcity of foreign exchange. In this situation it seems quite illogical to spend
national capital to buy existing foreign enterprises, paying in foreign currency,
rather than dedicate this money to build new enterprises. It is true that divi-
dends, royalties, and interest have come to be a very heavy burden on Latin
American economies, but this aspect can and should be regulated. Four years
prior to the Investment Code, Colombia had established such controls and her
experience is enlightening. Although remittance of dividends was permitted
up to 14 per cent of investment (the Investment Code rule was based on this
law) transfers during the past few years have reached only 7.2 per cent of the
total book value of foreign investments."'
Moreover, those antagonists of foreign investment who argue that the re-
30 ANDI. DECLARACION DE LA XXVIII ASAMBLEA. Manizales. Octubre 1972.
31 M. Rizo, supra note 16.
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mittance of dividends places an undue burden on the external balance of pay-
ments, fail to take into consideration an important secondary effect of foreign
investments--especially those made by multinational corporations. The experi-
ence of Latin America clearly shows that multinational corporations produce a
much greater proportion of goods for export than do their national counter-
parts. For this reason, the Colombian law which established limitations on the
transfer of dividends also provided a system in which new foreign investors were
required to obtain approval of their investments 2 In this way foreign capital
was channeled into sectors of interest to Colombia. In establishing these controls
the Colombian government was realistic enough not to impose any obligation
upon the foreign investor to become a minority partner. Their primary purpose
was to attract foreign capital to those sectors of the economy where it would
produce the greatest benefit for the country.
There is yet another aspect of the Investment Code which has privately
worried the national business leaders. Considering the very small availability
of private capital in the less developed countries,3 the general lack of confidence
in the stock market and the traditional tendency to invest in real estate, mort-
gages, bonds, and similar values, there will be few practical possibilities of
transferring foreign-owned shares to the private national investor. The only
possible buyer will be the state especially in view of the fact that almost all the
shares of old enterprises will come on the market at the same time. The private
sector has reasoned rightly that the practical result of the Investment Code will
be an increased ownership and intervention of the state leading to a general
decrease of private initiative.
In its original version the proposed Investment Code went so far as to
provide that the preferable method of divesting foreign-owned shares was
through sale to the government. This statement was suppressed under the pres-
sure of the Colombian business world. In all probability this provision was
eliminated from the final draft on the view that the practical result would be
the same in any event.
From the foreign investor's point of view the fact that his future partner
will generally be the state and not a private shareholder is rather convenient.
In South America governments are among the few who have money to invest.
Thus it may be easier for the foreign investor, although at first glance it may not
seem so, to get a fair price for his divested shares from the state than from pri-
vate buyers. The stock markets in South America are of very limited capacity.
In Colombia for instance where in the past decade only one stock exchange
existed in Bogota, the whole volume of yearly movement in bonds and stocks
together during the years 1965 to 1968 was oscillating between 513 million and
545 million pesos; the whole volume did not reach 50 million dollars a year.3'
The government, if interested in keeping a good reputation abroad, will observe
a moral obligation to pay a fair price. Furthermore the basis for determining
price may be the subject of an advance agreement with the government. In ad-
dition, Latin American governments are interested in long-term goals and once
32 DECRETO Lny 444. Dec. 1944. DIARo OFICIAL.
33 Supra note 28.
34 A. BASCH AND M. KYBAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMMICA (1970).
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these goals are respected, a governmental partner will probably interfere much
less in the daily management of the company than a private investor.
Finally the leaders of private enterprise in Colombia feared that as a result
of an economic union with Chile, with its Marxist President and socialistic
program, 5 the Andean pact and the Investment Code would become a Trojan
horse introducing state control of all enterprises and slowly bring the economic
and social policies of the subregion closer to the socialistic model. It is difficult
to ascertain how far and how quickly this process may proceed and what polit-
ical changes the future may bring, but despite some official governmental declara-
tions, e.g., Cuzco Declaration, March 1971, concerning "ideological pluralism"
and "self-determination," this aspect cannot be ignored as a possible deterrent
to foreign investment.
The most immediate problem created by the Investment Code decisions is
whether a foreign parent corporation, which knows that within a certain time
it will become a minority partner, will continue to bring into its Andean sub-
sidiary its constantly developing technology. The Council of the Americas, a
U.S. business organization representing corporations which own 85 per cent of
the total U.S. private investment in Latin America, is of the opinion that the
Investment Code will discourage transfers of technology to a foreign affiliate.
If an affiliate was slated for divestiture, few companies would provide their most
advanced technology to a future competitor. 6
The Council of the Americas also conducted a survey in 1971 on the effects
of the proposed Investment Code on the U.S. investors. Of the 202 companies
solicited, 56 responded, and 51 (about 90 per cent) indicated that the Invest-
ment Code would discourage their investment in the ANCOM countries. Their
reactions to the Code were varied with responses ranging from mild to very
negative. Should these attitudes hold, the multinational corporations will show
less interest in the ANCOM countries and some will simply terminate further
investment. Of course, concrete decisions will depend on the particular situation
as well as the general climate for foreign investment. The interest of a particular
business enterprise in ANCOM will reflect its general interest and need to ex-
pand abroad and will be shaped in part by conventional business considerations
such as the ratio of risk capital to the expected margin of profit, etc. In the area
of oil and mineral exploitation different considerations than conventional business
motives may prevail, for instance, the necessity for oil or other minerals for the
American economy. On the other hand, in this field the obligation for the
foreign investor to become a minority partner does not exist according to article
40 of the Investment Code. Therefore, the government may grant to the foreign
investor a full concession provided its duration does not exceed 20 years. The
provisions of the Investment Code in this area are less harsh. This is because
Andean Governments know that any exploitation on a large scale cannot be ac-
complished without foreign skill and capital.
There may be yet another important consequence of the Investment Code.
The Andean Common Market was created with a view to becoming an economic
35 This article was written prior to the coup in Chile in September 1973.
36 Survey conducted by Harvard Business School Students. M. Rizo, supra note 16.
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unit sufficiently developed to compete on an equal level with Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico in LAFTA, or perhaps on an even wider free trade area including all
of Latin America. If, as seems probable, the most important multinational man-
ufacturing corporations interested in investing in Latin America decide on Brazil,
with its open-door policy toward foreign investment, instead of the ANCOM
countries, the gap between countries such as Brazil and ANCOM will widen,
rather than diminish.
As a consequence of Brazil's economic policies, foreign investments of great
importance are taking place there. For example, in 1971 Volkswagen manu-
factured 295 thousand cars in Brazil, and during the first four months of 1972
its exports reached $15 million. Significantly, Volkswagen has met with some
success in opening up a market for its finished vehicles in Peru3 It is difficult to
imagine that any multinational corporation will contemplate investments of this
magnitude under the present rules of the Investment Code, and it is incon-
ceivable that the ANCOM countries will be able to create such enterprises with
only their own resources.
If the draftsmen of the Code in reaching their decisions considered Mexico's
rule requiring the foreign investor to become a minority partner, they failed to
realize that Mexico took this measure at a time when it was far more industrial-
ized than are the ANCOM countries at present. Besides this, the Mexican
government is authorized to make exceptions from the "Mexicanization" rule
in all cases of foreign investments which are considered especially important to
the Mexican economy. Without new foreign investments of capital and tech-
nology, the ANCOM countries cannot hope to close this gap.
The most probable outcome of the Investment Code will be that some
political leaders will satisfy their nationalistic pride, but the people governed by
them may lose a valuable opportunity to increase the pace of their economic
progress. Although the ultimate consequences of the Investment Code for the
ANCOM countries will probably remain uncertain over the next several years,
certain more immediate consequences are reasonably foreseeable. In view of the
fact that the tradition and experience in Western legal thinking" of countries
such as Colombia far surpass that found in the majority of underdeveloped
nations, particularly those in Asia and Africa, it seems probable that other
countries, for good or bad, will follow the example of the Investment Code, and
so it will give beginning to a new legal concept of regulations for foreign invest-
ments made by groups of less developed countries. Considering the low pre-Code
figures for new foreign investment in the manufacturing sector of the Andean
countries, the effect of the Investment Code as a precedent for other less
developed regions may prove to be of much greater significance to the future of
foreign investment in the Third World than its direct economic impact in the
Andean area.
On the other hand, the adoption of the Investment Code may also invite
consideration of new or completely different solutions. Those multinational
corporations which find the new rules unacceptable may try other business
37 THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 1972 at 52.
38 See Oliver, supra note 14.
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methods, resting on a different legal basis, which will be convenient to them and
to the host countries. For instance, "coproduction agreements" through which
machinery, technology and managerial skills are sold by the foreign company on
an intermediate or long-term basis may be a convenient scheme. The foreign
company which sells the package may also participate in profits for a certain
period of time-an aspect which may prove quite agreeable to the Latin host
countries. This type of arrangement is used by the communist countries in the
Third World and by Western countries within the communistic bloc, so it seems
to be a method convenient for dealings between groups of countries on different
economic and technological levels.
As an alternative, Dr. Carlos Lleras, when he was President of Colombia
(1966-70), insisted that what is most needed from the private sector of developed
countries is a supply of long-term capital. He was comparing Latin America
with the United States of the 19th century when the United States was develop-
ing with European capital. Unfortunately for Latin America, conditions have
changed and private investors are no longer interested in long-term loans to
foreign countries. This type of credit is made available only by International
Agencies, such as B.I.D., A.I.D., etc.
A different solution is sought by Japan who has limited investments in
Latin America, 350 million dollars at the end of 1967 as compared with 11.667
million dollars of United States investments at the end of 1969. Japan's interest
has taken the following form: a minority participation in new enterprises to
which Japan contributes part of the capital, technology and administrative skills,
machinery, and later a continuous supply of raw materials. Conditions offered
are very favorable to the Latin industries with the underlying objective of as-
suring clients for Japanese exported machinery and raw materials. In the case
of some extractive industries, the Japanese machinery is installed by Japanese
personnel. Such machinery is made available on long-term credit with repay-
ment made by the purchase of the extracted minerals at discounted prices. With
this type of strategy the Japanese are entering the markets without great invest-
ments of capital and with little conflict between their objectives and the policy
of the Andean Code or similar policies present in Latin America. 9
V. Conclusion
In spite of all the obstacles and attendant difficulties facing the foreign
investor, there is a powerful argument in favor of the joint venture in countries
with strong nationalistic tendencies. The existence of a local partner or, still more,
the state as a partner, reduces the popular nationalistic opposition to the multi-
national corporations, while offering political benefits and knowledge of the
local conditions and mentality. Although the Investment Code gives no legal
guarantee against expropriation, once the joint venture starts to function accord-
ing to the provisions of the Investment Code, the influence and the visibility of
the foreign investor will be diminished so much that in all probability the
39 Wionczek, Experiencias del sector privado japones en America Latina. OEA-CIES
(1971). Article was published by Bco. Nacional de Comercio Exterior.
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demagogical and psychological pressures for nationalizations will be alleviated.
In the end the multinational corporation may discover that, although it lacks
majority control, it may be more pleasant and convenient to work within tech-
nical limits, leaving public relations, negotiations with outsiders, and marketing
solely to the national partners. If the foreign investor would start to work within
these limitations, the Third World's fear of multinational corporate domination
may slowly diminish. In the long run this may lead to more foreign investment
in which multinational enterprises, albeit with smaller individual participation
in each venture, will bring more of their technology to the Third World while
continuing to enjoy the fruits of expansion.
William D. Rogers, President of American Society of International Law,
puts it this way:
Recent Latin American attitudes toward foreign business are the under-
standable, perhaps inevitable, culmination of the region's past experiences
in world business. The nations of Latin America have concluded that they
were exploited by stronger outside forces for three centuries. Now they
demand an end to dependency.4"
It may very well be that the relationships between North and South America
would improve once a better balance of economic power is achieved. It may
also be that once national or joint enterprises develop the self-sustaining ability
to exploit modem technology, the governments of the less developed countries
would become more tolerant of future foreign investment. It is clear that the
business prospects for multinational corporations under the Investment Code
restrictions are far from being as easy or lucrative as they were one or two
decades ago. But the times are changing and there is no alternative but to co-
operate or abandon the markets of these and probably other countries of the less
developed world. Many investors in Mexico found that it is possible to accom-
modate themselves to the roughly similar rules of "Mexicanization." The future
may belong to those who will first accept the reality of the era of nationalism,
which will be a fact of life in the developing countries for a long period of time.
Success will depend on their adaptability to the new perspective of the Third
World.
40 Rogers, Challenge for U.S. Investment in Latin America, 4 LAW AND POLICY IN INTER-
NATIONAL BusinEss 563 (1972).
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